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SUMMARY
Andreas Østhagen looks at oil and gas development across the North American Arctic coastal wa-
ters. How do the interests and positioning of elected regional governments in the Arctic contribute 
to the overall pace of natural resource development?
Popular discourse, alongside a multitude of research and policy documents, tends to describe re-
cent developments in the Arctic through generalisations. Yet for the thousands of people inhabiting 
the Arctic Circle – indigenous and non-indigenous – different challenges and opportunities present 
themselves. They are caused by variations across the Arctic in terms of resource potential, climate 
and infrastructure. Additionally, the systemic political set-up in each country determines how lo-
cal and regional levels interact and formulate their respective positions on the development taking 
place around them. This article examines at the role of the regions and their interests – an impor-
tant subject given that natural resource development is set to take place in the regions themselves, 
and under their remit. Of particular interest is offshore petroleum development in North America 
given that this part of the Arctic has been opened up for exploratory drillings in coastal waters faster 
than anywhere else. 
Initially, higher price levels for oil and gas, in addition to increased accessibility, set the context for 
increased commercial interests in the region. This, however, does not provide a complete picture. 
This is evidenced by the fact that the development of different parts of the North American Arctic 
has progressed at different speeds. Although they share many traits, the processes of developing 
Arctic oil and gas in the Northwest Territories, Alaska and Greenland are in fact remarkably diverse. 
It will be argued that decisions concerning how and when to open up new Arctic offshore areas for 
prospecting and exploratory drilling are as much a consequence of internal political factors aris-
ing from the interaction of national and regional levels of power, as to wider international trends. 
Since the final decision to allow exploratory drillings depends upon a competence struggle between 
federal and regional governments, understanding the role of regions in the process of opening-up 
new offshore leases is therefore crucial to understanding Arctic oil and gas development at large.
Østhagen’s IFS Insight is a product of the international research programme Geopolitics in the 
High North (2008–2012). To learn more about the programme publications, visit www.geopoli-
ticsnorth.org.
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ARCTIC OIL AND GAS 
THE ROLE OF REGIONS
As more actors find themselves engaged in an 
ever widening debate on developments in the 
Arctic region, conflicting interests emerge be-
tween those intent on making use of the re-
gion’s resources and those intent on securing 
its preservation. In this debate, the continued 
push for oil and gas exploration is proving in-
creasingly contentious, comprising questions of 
climate change, energy security and the impact 
on indigenous and local communities. 
Consequently, scholars in the fields of political 
science and economy have taken a particular 
interest in Arctic oil and gas development, at-
tributing to it rising commodity prices, new 
technologies and increased accessibility. The 
depletion of southern oil and gas fields along 
with the vast resource potential of the Arctic, 
first famously stated in the 2000 U.S. Geologi-
cal Survey report, provide additional motivation 
to explore the region’s possibilities. 
While these factors help explain some of the 
background to the increasing commercial pres-
ence in the region, they do not provide a com-
plete picture. This is highlighted by the fact 
that the development of different areas of the 
Arctic has varied in pace and faced a variety of 
obstacles. Despite certain common traits, the 
process of developing Arctic oil and gas has 
proved diverse. It is therefore surprising that 
case-specific oil and gas developments have not 
attracted a greater focus within contemporary 
Arctic research. 
This article is a study of one of the key dimen-
sions influencing case-specific developments, 
namely the interests of those actually inhab-
iting the areas where offshore exploitation is 
being considered. The study asked what role 
these interests have in the process of develop-
ing oil and gas resources in the North Ameri-
can Arctic. Given the democratic governance of 
these areas, regional governments are assumed 
to embody exactly these interests, as they are 
regularly held accountable by their respective 
Arctic constituencies. This study’s primary task 
was therefore to analyse how the interests and 
positioning of elected regional governments in 
the Arctic contribute to the overall pace of natu-
ral resource development. 
I will argue that while varying commercial vi-
ability can account for differences in petroleum 
development across the Arctic, regional inter-
ests are imperative to the trajectory of develop-
ment itself. The active participation of regional 
governments, balanced between internal cohe-
sion in their own regions and interests at the 
federal/national level, contributes to setting 
the pace of offshore petroleum development. In 
turn, the way competence and autonomy over 
offshore resource management has been dis-
tributed determines the systemic and political 
environment in which decisions to allow drilling 
can be made. 
This article will further attempt to demonstrate 
how regional interests, through the regional 
governments operating along these lines, can 
account for some of the variances in petroleum 
development throughout the North American 
Arctic. Understanding how such interests are 
defined, how they interact with federal/national 
governments, and how they are restricted by 
the political framework in each case, is argu-
ably key to understanding Arctic oil and gas 
development at large. As such, the role of the 
regions, as expressed in the mode of interaction 
between regional interests and federal/national 
policy makers, constitutes an integral factor that 
deserves to be incorporated in the discourse and 
study of Arctic oil and gas development.
Offshore development in North America is of 
particular interest given that this area of the Arc-
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tic has seen the fastest expansion of exploratory 
drilling in coastal waters. Developments off the 
coast of the North American Arctic have only 
recently begun to generate results. It is there-
fore reasonable to expect, in a few years’ time, 
numerous exploratory offshore drilling opera-
tions to have been conducted in all three North 
American Arctic territories. It is also possible 
that large, commercially viable fields will be dis-
covered, which can only intensify the debate on 
how to balance economic interests against en-
vironmental concerns. All the North American 
Arctic territories are additionally part of larger 
democratic systems, making the role and inter-
ests of the regional governments comparable. 
Understanding the balance of the competing 
interests engaged in the matter – with a par-
ticular focus on the role of regions – can shed 
new light on how decisions concerning oil and 
gas development are made. 
This article aspires to re-contextualise the 
debate about Arctic oil and gas by examining 
three on-going offshore oil and gas cases: (1) 
the Chukchi Sea off Alaska in the United States; 
(2) the Beaufort Sea off the Northwest Territo-
ries in Canada; and (3) the waters off Greenland 
as part of the realm of Denmark. These cases 
have all generated a certain amount of contro-
versy, pitting environmental interests against 
commercial. They also serve as prime examples 
of how contemporary Arctic oil and gas devel-
opment has unfolded, while providing an indi-
cation of how rapidly it is likely to expand in the 
future. It is therefore the intention of this article 
to contribute to a realignment in Arctic research 
– away from the sweeping generalisations that 
dominate much of the current discourse – to-
wards research that is primarily concerned with 
the different aspects of specific development. In 
turn, such research should aspire to be more 
broadly applicable, beyond the Arctic, providing 
new scholarly insights with a wider scope. 
The Arctic is defined as everything above the 
Arctic Circle, at 66º 33’ 44” north of the 
Equator. The North American Arctic encom-
passes Alaska in the United States; Yukon, the 
Northwest Territories and Nunavut in Canada; 
and Greenland, which is geographically North 
American, but politically part of the realm of 
Denmark. Drawing on a qualitative analysis of 
interviews, policy documents, and public and 
academic writings on the topic, this article is 
one of a growing number of publications to fo-
cus on developments in the Arctic. The study 
is part of a larger Arctic research programme, 
‘Geopolitics in the High North’, the lead partner 
of which is the Norwegian Institute for Defence 
Studies (IFS).
The following sections will first explain the de-
velopment of Arctic oil and gas in an interna-
tional context, and discuss the factors that have 
contributed to increased interest amongst oil 
and gas companies in recent years. Second, the 
three cases of Arctic offshore petroleum devel-
opment – (1) the Chukchi Sea off Alaska; (2) 
the Beaufort Sea off the Northwest Territories; 
and (3) the waters off Greenland – will be ex-
amined with a view to comparing their differ-
ent developmental traits. This comparison will 
enable us in the third section to assess the role 
of the regions in economic petroleum develop-
ment itself, and provide a fuller understanding 
of oil and gas activities in the Arctic.
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
From a commercial point of view, petroleum 
development is initially dependent on two fac-
tors: (1) the cost of retrieving resources from 
their source; and (2) the price of these resources 
as they reach their markets. In the past cen-
tury, both factors have fluctuated a great deal, 
causing commercial interest in the Arctic to 
fluctuate as well. Low oil prices, a harsh climate 
and challenges related to transportation hin-
dered the development of the region in the early 
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Twentieth century, and it was not until after 
World War II that some petroleum basins were 
exploited for export purposes. The growing de-
mand for petroleum in the post-war period and 
national energy security concerns prompted the 
Canadian and American governments to offer 
incentives to companies to explore their respec-
tive Arctic regions (Emmerson 2010, 227).
At first, developments in Alaska and the North-
west Territories focused on onshore resources 
because they were easily recoverable; indeed, 
in some cases, oil was literally seeping out of 
the ground. When the first oil crisis, in 1973, 
caused prices to spike, the assumed potential 
of offshore operations in the Arctic attracted 
the interest of companies and governments 
alike. Lease sales were held for different parts of 
offshore Canada and the US, with the govern-
ments in Ottawa and Washington going so far 
as to offer subsidies to promote activity (Em-
merson 2010, 227). The findings, however, 
did not warrant continued development of off-
shore drilling – especially as oil prices began to 
retreat in the mid-80s. Coupled with rising cost 
estimates on the infrastructure needed to trans-
port the resources southwards, the offshore 
fields were abandoned. The resulting situation 
throughout the 70s and 80s was that onshore 
Alaska was the only part of the North Ameri-
can Arctic where oil and gas were produced in 
sufficient quantities to render export a feasible 
option. Yet the region was thought to contain 
a significant amount of undiscovered hydrocar-
bon resources. 
RENEWED INTEREST  
At the turn of the millennium, the combination of 
new technology, sustained high commodity prices 
and decline in output from the traditional petroleum 
regions again made the Arctic an interesting place 
for companies looking for new opportunities. The 
increased focus on the Arctic since 2000, amongst 
media, industry, academia and policy makers alike, 
is arguably a consequence of the influx of such in-
terested parties to this part of the world. The follow-
ing three sections will highlight some of the factors 
behind this influx of oil companies. 
Resource access and appraisal 
The accelerated melting of sea ice is not only creat-
ing concern about the results of a changing climate, 
it is providing opportunities for economic develop-
ment. On September 18, 2012, the summer sea ice 
coverage reached an all-time low, breaking the 4.17 
million square kilometre record of 2007, when it 
only covered 3.41 million square kilometres (Vidal 
2012). The retreating ice sheet is not only caus-
ing alarm, it provides an opportunity to extend the 
summer drilling season. In 2000, the US Geologi-
cal Survey (USGS) published a report on global oil 
and gas resources (USGS 2000). It was interpreted 
as claiming that 25 per cent of the world’s remain-
ing undiscovered resources were in the Arctic. The 
USGS, along with other agencies, has since updated 
its assessments. The new estimates were published 
in the 2008 Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal 
(USGS 2008). The mean value for recoverable oil 
resources in the Arctic is stated as nearly 90 billion 
barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas 
and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids (ibid.). At 
the time of the report, the USGS estimated that these 
resources comprised about 13 per cent of the undis-
covered recoverable conventional oil resources in the 
world and 30 per cent of the undiscovered recover-
able conventional natural gas resources, with 80 per 
cent of the resources found offshore (ibid., 3). The 
word “undiscovered” was somewhat neglected in the 
public discourse on the Arctic resources and their 
potential; observers were now saying that around a 
quarter of the remaining oil and gas in the world was 
to be found in the Arctic (Burkeman 2008; Klare 
2012). Irrespective of the accuracy of these assess-
ments, or the rhetoric surrounding the expected re-
source potential, they undoubtedly helped spark an 
interest in Arctic hydrocarbons amongst companies 
and politicians located both inside and beyond the 
Arctic Circle.
Price rise
Any commercial Arctic petroleum development is 
also inherently dependent on the profitability, which 
in turn depends on oil and gas price levels. Oil prices 
started to rise in 2000 due to unrest and uncer-
tainty in parts of the oil-producing world. From an 
annual average of approximately USD12 per bar-
rel of imported crude in 1998, prices rose to ap-
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proximately USD50 in 2005 before peaking at an 
annual average of almost USD100 in 2008. Price 
levels in 2011 and 2012 remained high, breaching 
the USD100-barrier on several occasions. The In-
ternational Energy Agency (IEA) also argues that the 
cost of Arctic oil production is very high, ranging be-
tween USD40 and USD100 per barrel (Diczfalusy 
2012). A sustained high oil price is therefore one of 
the main determinants of the decision to invest in 
production of Arctic oil resources. 
The Henry Hub natural gas spot price for the North 
American market has also seen a remarkable shift the 
last decade, albeit in the opposite direction of the oil 
price curve. Following relatively low levels at the end 
of the 1990s, at USD2.36 per MMBtu of natural 
gas in December 1999, prices rose and alternated 
between USD4.47 and USD13.42 from late 2002 
to 2009 (EIA 2013). From 2010, however, after a 
rather sudden boom in domestic shale gas produc-
tion, the United States embarked on a policy of self-
sufficiency in gas. Price levels dropped accordingly. 
Between 2010 and 2011, prices lay around USD4, 
while in 2012 they hung between USD1.95 (April) 
and USD3.54 (December) (EIA 2013). This has led 
some to question the commercial viability of North 
American gas projects in the Arctic, where the cost 




Considerable technological advances have been 
made in the twenty odd years since the last offshore 
Arctic drilling boom took place. Oil companies’ 
continued drive to expand operations and explore 
both the North Sea and the Gulf of Mexico has led 
to new equipment and knowledge that can be ap-
plied to Arctic drilling (Klare 2012, 44). The first 
Norwegian offshore gas production in the Arctic 
came at the Snøhvit field, which was the first opera-
tion to make use of subsea installations in Norway 
(Statoil 2009). Future offshore oil production at the 
Goliat field in Northern Norway, or the Prirazlom-
noye field in North-West Russia, depend on state 
of the art drilling platforms able to withstand drift-
ing sea ice throughout the year (Glæserud 2012). 
Shell has also been active at the Sakhalin oil field 
in sub-Arctic Russia, operating in Arctic conditions 
(Shell U.S. 2010). Technological advances and op-
erating experience have enabled the oil companies 
to develop similar equipment for the North Ameri-
can Arctic, where sea ice constitutes one of the main 
challenges. Rising oil and gas prices also provide an 
incentive to invest in research and technological de-
velopment, spurring companies onwards. 
In sum, the expected increase in worldwide energy 
demand, Arctic resource appraisals, oil and gas price 
levels and new technology constitute the explana-
tory  factors when assessing what hinders and drives 
Arctic petroleum development. 
THREE CASES OF ARCTIC OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT
The factors outlined above will set the tone for future 
Arctic oil and gas developments in North America. 
Increased interest in government and industry is a 
natural result of these factors, and is in line with the 
initial observation that any petroleum activity comes 
as a consequence of the cost of extraction and the 
market price of the commodity. However, Arctic oil 
and gas development is by no means uniform or co-
herent, as the differences in Arctic regions’ approach 
to, and emphasis on, offshore petroleum industry 
show. The history and current status of three spe-
cific cases in the North American Arctic will now be 
briefly explored, providing this study with the em-
pirical data from which the role of regional interests 
can be identified and analysed. Each of the three 
cases will be outlined chronologically, with a view to 
highlighting the most engaged actors and interests.
UNITED STATES: ALASKA AND THE CHUKCHI 
SEA
Historical petroleum development
The first significant petroleum discovery in the 
Alaskan Arctic came onshore in 1968 at the North 
Slope, in what is now known as the Prudhoe Bay oil 
field. In combination with extensive onshore devel-
opment on the North Slope in the 70s and rising 
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oil prices worldwide, the US government encouraged 
several exploratory drillings offshore in the Beaufort 
Sea in the 70s and 80s, to be followed in the Chuk-
chi Sea in late 80s and early 90s. As the structural 
bed of the Chukchi Sea is similar to that of the North 
Slope, it is expected to contain a vast amount of oil 
reserves (USGS 2008). They could be connected to 
the Trans Alaskan Pipeline System (TAPS), which 
was completed in 1977 to transport oil from the 
North Slope down to the port of Valdez in the south 
of Alaska. 
Lease sales for the area, specifically sales 106 and 
126, were carried out in 1988 and 1991 respec-
tively. Shell drilled four out of the five exploratory 
wells that came out of these lease sales, but the wells 
were capped and abandoned as prices fell in the 
early 90s and findings did not warrant commercial 
activity (Shell International 2012). Drilling in the 
area, however, is limited to a few months late in the 
summer when the sea ice has retreated sufficiently. 
The leases eventually expired, and Chukchi Sea pe-
troleum development was put on hold. In 1989, 
the tanker Exxon Valdez grounded off the coast of 
Alaska on its way to California. The environmental 
consequences of that incident have frequently been 
cited by NGOs and others opposed to Arctic drilling 
to remind the American public of the risk of Arctic 
petroleum operations.
New interest in the Chukchi Sea
The decision to reopen the Chukchi Sea for lease 
sales was made during George W. Bush’s first presi-
dential term, over a decade after the previous unsuc-
cessful drillings. For operations inside three nautical 
miles from land, the State of Alaska is in charge of 
opening up areas for petroleum activity and con-
ducting lease sales. The Chukchi Sea, however, is 
located on the outer continental shelf, relatively far 
from Alaskan onshore territory. Chukchi oil and gas 
development therefore falls under the Department 
of Interior’s (DoI) competence, as they are empow-
ered under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
to manage petroleum resource development located 
on the shelf. 
For any area to be opened up for public lease sale, 
it has to be included in the running ‘Five Year 
Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Oil and Gas Leas-
ing P rogram’, which sets out a strategy for the DoI’s 
development of the natural resources of the US 
outer continental shelf (BOEM 2012b). When the 
Chukchi Sea received renewed interest the Miner-
als Management Service (MMS), a bureau under the 
DoI, was responsible for managing these resources 
and enacting the five-year programme. The decision 
to include the Chukchi Sea in the MMS five-year 
programme for 2002–2007, made by the Secretary 
of the Interior Gale A. Norton and the Bush admin-
istration, was seen by some to be a political deci-
sion to appease industry interests (McMillan, 2006; 
Wallsten & Hamburger 2006). It was announced in 
2005, as the MMS “received broader industry inter-
est in the Chukchi Sea planning area than expected” 
(Goll 2005). 
Representing the regional interests of the State of 
Alaska, Governor Sarah Palin was vocal in 2008 and 
2009, emphasising the unlocked resource potential 
in the Chukchi Sea. The succeeding consecutive re-
gional governments have exhibited a strong interest 
in offshore development, acting as a supporter and 
facilitator of continued oil and gas exploration in the 
Arctic (Knudson 2012). This comes as a conse-
quence of the State’s dependence on revenues from 
the pipeline system and the companies operating in 
the region (ibid.). The TAPS pipeline from the North 
Slope to Valdez also constitutes a commercial in-
terest in its own right, as declining throughput has 
caused the operator, Alyeska Pipeline, to announce 
that new oil fields in production will be essential to 
keep the pipeline running as it is reaching its low-
er threshold of operations (Bailey 2012). As the 
throughput of TAPS has declined, Alaskan Gover-
nors and Senators from both parties have argued for 
increased Arctic offshore development to sustain the 
pipeline operation (ibid.). Arguments concerning en-
ergy security and maintaining growth and employ-
ment in Alaska are consequently used to influence 
federal decision makers to open up more areas for 
lease sales. 
At the US federal level, the motivation to open up 
for lease sales stemmed from a desire in the ad-
ministration to decrease dependence on foreign oil 
imports as prices rose internationally (U.S. Gov-
10
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ernment 2012). The Chukchi Sea lease sale was 
eventually postponed to 2008, to be included in 
the 2007–2012 programme, as additional environ-
mental assessments were needed. The lease sale, 
termed 193, became the most profitable lease sale 
ever conducted in Alaska, providing a total revenue 
of over USD2.6 billion (DOE/NETL 2009). In par-
ticular Shell, but also Statoil and ConocoPhillips, 
acquired a large number of the available leases and 
started planning exploratory drillings. However, as 
soon as the leases were bought in 2008, different 
environmental NGOs and indigenous groups mo-
bilised against the government claiming that there 
had not been enough environmental consideration, 
with a strong emphasis on the potential impact on 
marine life (Race 2011). A coalition of such interest 
groups appealed to the U.S. District Court of Alaska, 
which halted any subsequent exploratory drilling in 
the summer season of 2009.
The Macondo accident and future prospects
In the immediate aftermath of the explosion on the 
Deepwater Horizon rig in April 2010, the Obama 
administration imposed a six-month ban on any 
new offshore drilling in US waters. The oil spill in 
the Gulf of Mexico led to intense questioning of the 
industry’s safety regulations and ability to operate in 
fragile environments (National Commission 2011). 
The Department of Interior, and in particular the 
MMS, received substantial criticism and underwent 
a restructure aimed at separating the different func-
tions into new independent bureaus. Initially, the 
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation 
and Enforcement (BOEMRE) was created, before it 
later split into the Bureau of Ocean Energy Manage-
ment (BOEM) and the Bureau of Safety and Envi-
ronmental Enforcement (BSEE). Of these bureaus, 
BOEM is in charge of lease sales and opening up of 
new areas to offshore oil and gas development, while 
BSEE approves drilling plans and supervises the 
activities. However, the bureaus are still under the 
umbrella of the Department of Interior and closely 
linked with its political leadership (Lew 2012).
The ban on new offshore drilling consequently pre-
vented any further development in the Chukchi Sea 
in the summer of 2010. BOEM decided to re-affirm 
the lease sale with a new environmental supple-
mental study in 2011, prompting Shell to submit 
their exploratory drilling plans the same year (Race 
2011). Shell went public moreover in 2011, de-
manding a clearer set of regulatory rules for develop-
ing their leases in the Chukchi Sea (Slaiby 2012). 
In response, the Obama administration decided to 
establish an inter-agency working group on coordi-
nation of domestic energy development and permit-
ting in Alaska in July 2011, headed by US Deputy 
Secretary of the Interior David J. Hayes (The White 
House 2011). After being halted in the summer of 
2011 due to missing governmental permits, Shell 
was set to go for the 2012 drilling season. 
Although there were numerous delays and significant 
engagement amongst certain NGOs, Shell managed 
to acquire final approval from BSEE on August 30 
and started drilling its first exploratory well in the 
Burger prospect on September 8, 2012 (Cavnar 
2012). Shell in particular perceives there to be vast 
economic potential under the seabed, which is es-
sentially a continuation of the North Slope in Alaska 
(USGS 2008). The company has undoubtedly de-
veloped a unique knowledge of the area, which can 
explain why it has spent more than USD5 billion 
acquiring and developing offshore leases from the 
2008 lease sale (Chazan 2013). However, inter-
rupted by technical damage, ice presence and local 
whaling, the drilling was ultimately postponed, and 
Shell has decided to not return to the area in 2013 
(Bowers 2012; Broder 2013). ConocoPhillips and 
Statoil followed closely behind, seeing Shell’s strug-
gle for exploratory drilling approval as the litmus test 
for the region (U.S. Government 2012).
To summarise, although the Chukchi Sea has been 
developed over a long time frame, it is clear that 
commercial interests stemming from both drill-
ing companies, like Shell, and from interests locally 
onshore, are driving development in an area that is 
naturally difficult to operate in. The State of Alaska 
itself has been an active promoter of continued pe-
troleum development in the area, having clear inter-
ests in these activities but not the decision-making 
authority to allow drilling in the Chukchi Sea.
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CANADA: NORTHWEST TERRITORIES AND 
BEAUFORT SEA
Historical petroleum development
The development of Canadian Arctic oil and gas 
started even earlier than the Alaskan case following 
the discovery in 1920 of the Norman Wells field on 
the Mackenzie River in the Northwest Territories. 
Due to the high costs of extraction and transporta-
tion, production from the field was sporadic and at 
low volumes for local consumption until the Canol 
pipeline was built in collaboration with the US to 
supply oil to Alaska during the Second World War 
(Emmerson 2010, 175). When the pipeline was 
closed down in 1945, production from the field 
again became a local affair. The Prudhoe Bay dis-
covery in Alaska intensified the search in Canada. 
Oil and gas fields onshore in the Mackenzie Delta in 
the Northwest Territories were discovered, while oil 
was found in the Bent Horn field on Cameron Island 
in 1974 in the territory of Nunavut. The latter field 
led to production from 1985 until 1996, shipping 
a total of 2.8 million barrels through the Northwest 
Passage for domestic consumption in Canada (Rus-
sum 2012).
In this period, offshore exploration in the Beau-
fort Sea also intensified. Altogether, 86 wells were 
drilled from 1972 to 1989; an impressive amount 
given the harsh conditions and uncertain commer-
cial prospects of the area. These drillings were partly 
spurred by the lower tax rates for companies ven-
turing up north (Matthews 2011). Transportation of 
any production became an issue, though the idea of 
a gas pipeline stretching down south from the Mac-
kenzie Delta was ultimately rejected, as local con-
cerns and limited commercial feasibility hindered 
the process (ibid.). Although several Canadian com-
panies had been active in promoting the petroleum 
potential of the Beaufort Sea, the Arctic was mostly 
abandoned as prices fell in the mid-80s. 
New interest in the Beaufort Sea
As with the Chukchi Sea in Alaska, rising price lev-
els, new technology and positive resource apprais-
als again made the Canadian Arctic interesting for 
oil and gas multinationals. The USGS expects the 
Canadian basin of the Beaufort Sea to contain up 
to 10 billion barrels of oil and 56,000 billion cubic 
feet of natural gas (USGS 2008). While there are 
ongoing debates surrounding the transfer of regional 
governance to the Territories, the federal govern-
ment currently remains in control of developments 
both onshore and offshore in the Canadian North 
(Ibbitson 2013). The Department for Aboriginal Af-
fairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC) 
is in charge of conducting outer continental shelf 
lease sales in this region. The department subse-
quently manages any lease sale on the continental 
shelf stretching out from the Northwest Territories. 
In addition, the AAND is empowered with the man-
agement of onshore petroleum development in the 
Canadian Arctic. 
Lease sales are conducted on an annual basis, if suf-
ficient interest is declared by the relevant compa-
nies, and therefore not subject to the same five-year 
planning as in the US. Any subsequent approval of 
exploratory drilling plans is to be made by the semi-
independent National Energy Board (NEB), which 
covers the Arctic and a small portion of western 
Canada. The Board’s final recommendation is sub-
ject to the nationwide body National Resources 
Canada, which is the governmental branch respon-
sible for managing Canada’s natural resources at the 
federal level. The NEB estimates that ‘approximately 
35% of Canada’s remaining marketable resources 
of natural gas and 37% of remaining recoverable 
crude oil is in Northern Canada’ (AANDC 2012b). 
However, at the regional level, the Northwest Ter-
ritories’ interests in offshore development of the 
Beaufort Sea do not constitute a particularly strong 
driver in themselves. The region is not heavily de-
pendent on revenue from oil and gas given that cur-
rent production levels remain low and mainly geared 
to local consumption (Government of the Northwest 
Territories 2012). Additionally, local communities 
in the region have focused extensively on developing 
mineral deposits instead of oil and gas (Northwest 
Territories 2012). With the success of the diamond 
mines in the Northwest Territories, sentiment tends 
to favour mineral extraction, which is perceived to 
provide greater direct benefits in terms of revenue 
and labour (Chenier 2012). The federal government 
in Ottawa has also seemed somewhat reluctant in 
promoting its Arctic offshore resource potential, 
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given its uncertainty and growing production levels 
elsewhere in Canada (ibid.).
Pretty much driven by a rising commercial interest, 
the first lease sale rounds in the Beaufort Sea area 
after the millennium were conducted in 2002 and 
2004. In 2007, Imperial Oil won the bid for a large 
lease with a project proposal of CAD585 million. BP 
did the same in 2008, and Chevron followed suit 
in 2010. During this time, Chevron, Imperial and 
MGM conducted exploratory drillings onshore in the 
area, although the results mainly consisted of rela-
tively small gas fields (AANDC 2012a). 
Arctic Offshore Review and future prospects
As the incident in the Gulf of Mexico progressed, 
Canadian authorities imposed a halt on all further 
Arctic drilling until the NEB had conducted an Arc-
tic offshore drilling review; no drilling would take 
place until at least 2014 (ibid.). After intensive stud-
ies the Board released its review in December 2011, 
concluding that although it would be possible to 
commence drilling in the Arctic, any company would 
have to prove to have adequate safety measures with 
inclusion of the same season relief well policy (NEB 
2012). Although no offshore exploratory drilling has 
commenced since the NEB put forward its new filing 
requirements, both the Board and the AAND expect 
submissions of exploration plans from the com-
panies that acquired leases in 2008 and onwards 
(Chenier 2012). As the Canadian Beaufort Sea is 
expected to contain mainly natural gas deposits, any 
development would also depend on finding viable 
options for transportation, since Canada never built a 
pipeline equivalent to the TAPS in Alaska (O’Malley 
2011). Canada’s Mackenzie Valley Pipeline project 
faces political challenges and acts as barrier to in-
vestments in production. In an echo of other Arctic 
projects, permits are still pending and LNG facilities 
onshore have been mentioned as an alternative.
To summarise, while commercial petroleum inter-
ests undoubtedly exist in the region, there are un-
certainties related to governmental approval and the 
political framework in which the activities will pro-
ceed. In the near future, however, exploratory drilling 
plans are expected to be submitted by companies 
holding leases. The development of the region there-
after will depend largely on the commercial viability 
of the wells, on infrastructure and on public permits. 
This is especially amplified by the lack of regional 
and/or federal interests pushing for offshore devel-
opment, as the perceived gains of petroleum devel-
opment seem few and far between.
GREENLAND AND DENMARK
Historical petroleum development 
Greenland, as a part of the Kingdom of Denmark, 
was initially thought to have petroleum resources 
in the waters surrounding the island after seismic 
studies were conducted in the early 70s. As with 
C anada and the US, the sudden rise in prices in 
1973 sparked an interest in the region’s offshore 
petroleum potential. Leases were offered in 1975 
to companies like Mobil, Amoco, Chevron and To-
tal (Hammeken-Holm 2012b). Drilling commenced 
in 1976 and 1977, with a total of five wells, all 
deemed dry. Later studies undertaken by the Geo-
logical Survey of Denmark and Greenland in 1997 
discovered that these wells had been abandoned 
prematurely without complete knowledge of the re-
source potential (Pulvertaft 1997). In 2000, how-
ever, a sixth well drilled by Statoil also proved dry 
(Christiansen et al. 2001).
New interest in offshore Greenland
After acquiring Home Rule in 1979, and leaving 
the European Union (the then European Commu-
nity – EC) in 1985, natural resources in Greenland 
remained a policy field managed by the Danish 
government in Copenhagen. The Greenlandic self- 
government also maintained ties with the EU, with 
the status as Overseas Territory (European Com-
mission 2012). However, as both petroleum and 
mineral resources gained attention in the 90s, the 
Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum (BMP) was es-
tablished in the Greenlandic capital of Nuuk. In the 
USGS’s appraisal of 2008, the Greenlandic basin is 
estimated to contain approximately 17 billion bar-
rels of oil and 138,000 billion cubic feet of natural 
gas (USGS 2008). This area also includes, however, 
parts of East Canadian waters and is only a rough 
estimate. 
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The Greenlandic self-government, in collaboration 
with Copenhagen, offered up parts of the sea west 
of Greenland for petroleum exploration in 2002 and 
2004, resulting in only minor bids by small com-
panies. In 2006, on the other hand, the oil and gas 
industry had developed an interest in the region 
and the two lease sales that year resulted in a to-
tal of seven licences awarded to companies such as 
Statoil, DONG, Husky, Chevron, ExxonMobil and 
Cairn Energy (BMP 2012). Cairn was also granted 
licences in an open door lease sale in 2008. In addi-
tion, the hundred per cent Greenlandic state-owned 
company NUNAOIL has a natural right to 12.5 per 
cent of every lease granted, ensuring local Greenlan-
dic participation in every project (ibid.).
The Greenlandic self-government also acts as one 
of the key drivers in the development and manage-
ment of offshore lease sales. At present, Greenland 
depends heavily on funding from Denmark, amount-
ing to over DKK2,800 million every year, with an 
additional DKK320 million acquired from an annual 
European Union grant for fishing rights (Rasmussen 
2008). The Greenlandic government has conse-
quently been very active in promoting the hydrocar-
bon potential in its region with a view to increased 
economic independence from Denmark (Hamme-
ken-Holm 2012b). It has also wanted to attract 
international companies that could supplement the 
local NUNAOIL and provide capital and experience. 
Initially, the multinational energy companies were 
reluctant and sceptical, perceiving the risks to be too 
high, though this changed with the lease sale rounds 
in 2006 (ibid.). 
Self-governance and future prospects
In a 2008 referendum, the Greenlandic people fa-
voured increased independence from Denmark. 
The result was greater self-government, awarded 
to Greenland on June 21, 2009. This included the 
management of natural resources, enabling the self-
government and the BMP to manage their petroleum 
resources independently of Denmark (Hammeken-
Holm 2012a). Simultaneously, licenses were offered 
in the Baffin Bay area, in waters bordering Canada. 
By 2010, 17 applications had been received and 
seven licenses awarded to many of the same com-
panies listed earlier, in addition to others like Shell 
and ConocoPhillips. Based on the earlier acquired 
licences, Scottish Cairn Energy conducted a total of 
eight exploratory drillings at several sites in the sum-
mers of 2010 and 2011 off the coast of Greenland.
Although Cairn’s drillings did not find significant de-
posits, both the Greenlandic government and other 
heavily invested oil companies like Shell, Husky, 
Dong, and Statoil are intent on commencing further 
exploratory drillings based on seismic studies further 
north along the west coast (ibid.). In contrast to the 
other two regions in this study, Greenland has not 
had extensive experience with oil and gas produc-
tion. As such, companies willing to take the initial 
risk, like Cairn Energy, undoubtedly play a crucial 
role in leading the way for further petroleum activ-
ity along the coast. Also, where oil findings seems 
the most likely to be developed, there is currently 
no form of oil or gas transportation infrastructure, 
and any product would need to be exported to the 
international market for sale. 
In contrast to the Arctic parts of Canada and Alaska, 
on the other hand, Greenland’s location provides 
easy access to North American and/or European 
markets for shipments of oil. There are signs, howev-
er, that offshore petroleum activity might not consti-
tute the economic boom one expects in Greenland, 
with regional focus shifting increasingly towards 
the minerals sector (Acher & Fraende 2012). The 
self-government has also been forced to manage the 
interests of external actors like Greenpeace and the 
European Parliament, which criticise Greenland for 
recklessly allowing Arctic offshore drilling.  
To summarise, in Greenland, where exploratory 
drillings have already been conducted, multiple 
companies are engaged to exploit the expected off-
shore potential on both the east and the west coast. 
The regional interests stemming from the Greenlan-
dic self-government, in terms of aspiring towards 
economic independence, also drive the govern-
ment further than one has observed in Alaska or 
the Northwest Territories. However, the end goal is 
economic independence, not necessarily petroleum 
development per se.
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THREE CASES – SUMMARY TABLE
The table beneath summarises the main character-
istics of the three cases outlined above. The chrono-
logical study of the cases has helped to identify: (1) 
historic offshore activity in the area; (2) what consti-
tutes the regional and federal levels; (3) where the 
locus of decision-making capacity for lease sales in 
the respective area is located; (4) what interests the 
regions themselves have in this development; (5) 
and the current status of development in each case.
The first thing to note is that commercial interests 
are present in each case – a constant factor deter-
mining the comparability of the cases. Offshore de-
velopment across the North American Arctic also 
faces many of the same technological and climatic 
challenges. However, as highlighted in table 1, 
these three cases of Arctic offshore development are 
marked by a relatively varied set of characteristics. In 
particular, the systemic set-up differs greatly across 
each case. Drawing on the distinctions summarised 
in the table above, we can now turn to an analysis 
of the role of regional interests, as represented by 
the regional governments themselves. The central 
role played by these interests in developing offshore 
oil and gas in their respective Arctic territories will 
be outlined in the following sections. This in turn 
will help us conceptualise and explain why the three 
cases vary to the extent they do, while also allowing 
us to gain a deeper understanding of the different 
factors that influence development processes, and 
therefore Arctic oil and gas developments at large. 
THE REGIONAL INTEREST DIMENSION
As demonstrated by the three cases development 
reviewed in this study, commercial prospects are a 
given for any exploratory drilling discussion to occur. 
The level of interest, in combination with commer-
cial viability, is a strong determinant of the develop-
ment pace. However, although commercial factors 
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Department of Interior 
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Northern Development Canada 
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Petroleum (BMP),
Self-Government       
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4 - Regional 
interests
Strong interest in 
development. 
High dependency on 
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activities to provide 
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5 - Current status Pre-exploratory 
drillings.




TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF THE THREE CASES
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determine much of the development trajectory in all 
of the respective cases, they do not provide a com-
plete picture, as the next sections will attempt to 
outline. Looking at the cases in question, it appears 
that commercial viability, resource potential and cost 
of extraction cannot adequately explain why offshore 
development has progressed as it has.
The basic motivation for all the regional governments 
studied here is a desire to promote economic devel-
opment. Whether the goal is economic independ-
ence or sustaining high levels of tax revenue, the end 
result is the same, namely that in all three cases the 
regional governments are in favour of oil and gas ac-
tivity. How strongly these interests are defined, how-
ever, and how the regions promote their interests in 
interaction with the federal/national governments 
– which are not always as pro-development as they 
are themselves – arguably determine a great portion 
of the actual pace of oil and gas development in the 
North American Arctic. In sum, the regions must 
first form an interest before facing varying degrees 
of constraint on their ability to influence decisions 
and policies in their favour. Based on the three cases 
in this study, the relationship between regional in-
terests and their respective systemic constraints can 
help us understand this important dimension of Arc-
tic oil and gas development. 
DEFINING A REGIONAL INTEREST
First, the regions themselves need to have a clearly 
defined interest which they promote and act on as 
developments proceed. The regions’ preferences 
are naturally a product of their own dependence on 
oil and gas revenue to support local and regional 
economies. Perceived future gains from such activi-
ties inevitably also come into consideration. Internal 
cohesion, however, is often lacking, and although all 
these regions favour oil and gas activities, their com-
mitment and/or ability to promote this activity is a 
variable quantity. 
The Alaskan State government is undoubtedly in-
terested in developing any commercially viable fields 
that can feed into a shrinking petro-economy, with 
declining levels of onshore production (Knudson 
2012). The threat of losing jobs as the supply indus-
try and onshore operators scale down their activities 
serves as another incentive for regional governments 
intent on re-election. In addition, the operator of the 
Trans-Alaskan Pipeline System (TAPS), Alyeska, 
has, together with Shell, actively supported the ef-
forts of the State government in their campaign to 
convince the federal government of the need for Arc-
tic offshore development. 
In the Northwest Territories, regional interests are 
less clearly defined than those of their American 
counterpart to the west. Given the smaller popula-
tion and somewhat less developed infrastructure for 
petroleum activity, the promotion of regional inter-
ests is also at a very different level than in Alaska. 
Also, due to few petroleum producing activities, 
the regional economy does not depend as much 
on maintaining high production levels. Consecu-
tive regional governments have nevertheless been 
strong supporters of increased exploration activity 
in the Mackenzie delta and the Beaufort Sea, albeit 
without having the appropriate tools and ability to 
enforce progress, a point to which we will return in 
the following sections (Northwest Territories 2012). 
In Greenland, on the other hand, interests in oil and 
gas development are directly linked to the regional 
aspirations for wider economic independence from 
Denmark. As already mentioned, economic de-
pendency through transfers from both the EU and 
Copenhagen has sparked a quest to find new liveli-
hoods that can help Greenland deal with its steadily 
increasing public expenses. Some have also argued 
that further gains in self-determination should even-
tually lead complete independence. Its interest in oil 
and gas activity is therefore a natural consequence 
of the self-government’s economic aspirations and 
wish to make Greenland more assertive as the Arctic 
becomes an increasingly urgent topic on the interna-
tional agenda. 
STRUGGLING WITH INTERNAL COHESION 
AND PUBLIC OPINION
In addition to the regional interests described above, 
each of the three cases reveal a particular set of chal-
lenges that can serve to hinder the development of 
any oil and gas fields. Of particular importance are 
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the dynamics between NGOs and the public and 
private actors, in addition to the role of indigenous 
communities, both locally and nationally. These dy-
namics define the respective environments in which 
regional interests must operate to promote their 
policies. 
The State of Alaska 
Alaskan development is arguably the most conten-
tious in this study. Popular engagement through 
litigation, which has halted the process of allow-
ing exploratory drilling licences, has been intense 
in the State of Alaska after the Chukchi Sea lease 
sale in 2008. As the multiple lawsuits filed by local 
indigenous groups and NGOs show, there is by no 
means consensus in the State itself. People’s resent-
ment stems to a large degree from a lack of cohe-
sion amongst the indigenous population inhabiting 
the northern parts of Alaska (ibid.). There are almost 
as many viewpoints about offshore development as 
there are communities, with the most negative inter-
est groups joining forces with NGOs to contend gov-
ernment decisions that favour oil companies (Shell 
International 2012; U.S. Government 2012). 
National popular opinion in the United States is no 
easier to deal with. A lawsuit in May 2012 against 
the federal government managed to attract 1 million 
signatories across the US. Daily news coverage from 
different interest groups has continuously criticised 
the federal government’s decision to uphold the 
lease sale and award Shell the permits it needed to 
commence drilling in 2012 (Greenpeace 2012). Al-
together, the civic environment is highly active, but 
also highly divergent. This has led to a situation in 
which the State itself, through successive regional 
governments, has lobbied the federal government 
proactively to go along with offshore development, 
while regional environmental groups and local com-
munities attempt to stem these efforts through liti-
gation and mass protests. 
The Northwest Territories
In Canada, the popular environment has so far 
proved less volatile than in the US. Continuous dia-
logue with the Northwest Territory, indigenous peo-
ples and federal government has led, according to 
the Canadian government, to less tension and great-
er consensus (Chenier 2012). But the lower level of 
tension could arguably also be a natural consequence 
of a slower development pace. A more geographi-
cally divided and less politicised governmental struc-
ture is another contributing factor. Conducting lease 
sales only when there is stated interest, and using 
a broad call for opinion amongst local and regional 
populations, arguably make the process less volatile 
(Northwest Territories 2012). Popular resentment 
against Arctic drilling certainly exists, but only the 
future will indicate whether awarding companies fi-
nal drilling permits will be as controversial as in the 
US. Another factor of importance when considering 
Arctic industrial development in Canada is the role 
of the Arctic in society at large. Whereas the Arctic 
in the US is perceived as somewhat removed and 
distant from the lower 48, the Arctic is a powerful 
factor in defining national identity in Canada (Wil-
liams 2011). 
Greenland
In contrast to the other two regions, the indigenous 
peoples of Greenland, the Inuit, comprise the ma-
jority of the population in the region (Hammeken-
Holm 2012a). As such, the government effectively 
represents the interests of the majority of the indig-
enous population (ibid.). With the regional govern-
ment also deciding whether to open up for oil and 
gas development, Greenland succeeds in bypassing 
some of the internal disputes in the other two cas-
es, although tension has been felt between some of 
the smaller traditional communities and the capital 
Nuuk. Concern about petroleum developments has 
additionally been raised by the Inuit Circumpolar 
Council (ICC), representing the Inuit population liv-
ing in Canada, Alaska, Russia and Greenland (ICC 
2012). The ICC has not been directly critical of oil 
and gas developments in Greenland, but requested 
broader engagement with every layer of society and 
a more balanced approach towards the environment 
(ibid.). 
In sum, all the regional governments have a stated 
interest in offshore petroleum activity in their region 
– as long as it provides economic benefits to the re-
gion itself. Internal cohesion, however, when exter-
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nalising these interests, varies amongst these three 
parts of the North American Arctic. Such constraints 
on the political environment consequently influence 
how easily regional interests can be transformed into 
corresponding policies. The second influential fac-
tor is the systemic constraints, in terms of shared 
decision-making between the regional and the fed-
eral levels, and the interests of the federal level itself. 
SYSTEMIC CONSTRAINTS AND FEDERAL/ 
NATIONAL INTERESTS
The impact of regional interests is a function of how 
strongly these interests are enforced in the process 
of opening up areas for oil and gas activity. This re-
lates to the unique and systemic context in which 
the regional governments operate – a context that in 
turn determines how regional interests are allowed 
to influence the decision-making process. First, the 
devolved decision-making powers and degrees of 
autonomy vary considerably throughout the regions 
in question. Second, in all three cases, regional inter-
ests are balanced against federal/national approval 
of Arctic drilling. Federal interests come into play at 
this point, linked with the formulation of national 
energy policies. Local preferences, however, are not 
always aligned with those at the national level, and as 
a result, regional competence and decision- making 
powers have a considerable impact on the scope 
and pace of petroleum development. The systemic 
relationship between the regional and the federal/
national governments therefore determines much of 
the region’s ability to transform interests into action. 
United States and Washington D.C.
Owing to the federal system in the US, the State 
of Alaska is a relatively autonomous entity, despite 
the management of the Chukchi Sea falling outside 
its geographical jurisdiction, and therefore under 
the jurisdiction of the federal authorities (Anderson 
2012). The Department of Interior in Washington 
D.C. is the sole body responsible for this outer off-
shore development, although the State itself is highly 
active and engaged in the development process. It 
promotes oil and gas activity in its region through 
beneficial tax regimes and active collaboration with 
the respective industries, while also lobbying fed-
eral government to allow drilling to take place in the 
area. Consequently, there is a situation in which the 
State’s regional government acts as an independent 
body in pursuit of specific pro-development inter-
ests, aiming to convince the federal government to 
allow drilling off the coast. On the federal side, the 
decision-making process on opening up new areas 
for oil and gas exploration is also highly politicised, 
as any lease sale must be included in the Depart-
ment of Interior’s overarching five-year plan – a plan 
informed by political agendas as much as it is geared 
to optimising governance of offshore resources (DoI 
2012). 
Consequently, how strongly the US federal govern-
ment pushes for Arctic drilling in Alaska is, on the 
one hand, related to national energy interests, and 
on the other, a result of interest group interaction 
with central decision-makers (Lew 2012). The de-
velopment of unconventional natural gas resources 
elsewhere in the US has also lessened the perceived 
urgency of developing a natural gas in the Alaskan 
Arctic. The situation in the US is therefore one in 
which the federal government – positioned far from 
the Alaskan Arctic in both mind-set and geography 
– is wary of upsetting the balance between regional 
interests and environmental concerns as it will be 
held accountable for whichever decision, if any, is 
made (DoI 2013; U.S. Government 2012). 
Indeed, with the decision to allow Shell to conduct 
exploratory drillings causing a public outcry, the cur-
rent Obama administration appears to be somewhat 
more cautious than its predecessor, despite Obama’s 
first energy plan relying heavily on increasing do-
mestic oil production in Alaska. After the Macondo 
accident, rhetoric naturally took a turn towards ele-
vating environmental concerns. Separating the func-
tions of the former Minerals Management Service 
(MMS) into the Bureau of Ocean Energy Manage-
ment (BOEM) and the Bureau of Safety and Envi-
ronmental Enforcement (BSEE) has also been one 
way of de-politicising the management of oil and gas 
activities, following intense post-Macondo criticism 
of the MMS. However, the oft-stated goal to make 
use of domestic oil resources in the Arctic has yet to 
be altered: the new five-year plan for 2012–2017, 
released in November 2011, proposes that another 
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lease sale in the Chukchi Sea should take place in 
2016 (BOEM 2012a).
Canada and Ottawa
Of the three cases, it is arguable that Canada repre-
sents the strongest level of federal decision-making 
concerning oil and gas, despite an ongoing process 
of transferring governance to the territories (Ibbitson 
2013). The regional government of the Northwest 
Territories have a substantially lower degree of au-
tonomy than its American and Greenlandic counter-
parts. Although the federal government in Ottawa is 
slowly devolving decision-making competence and 
authority to the regional level, the starting point is 
relatively low and the Department for Aboriginal Af-
fairs and Northern Development (AANDC) is still in 
control of petroleum development both on and off-
shore (Ibbitson 2013). With the AANDC in charge 
of Arctic petroleum development, and the National 
Energy Board in charge of evaluating drilling applica-
tions, the process for conducting lease sales in the 
Beaufort Sea is arguably less politicised and more 
geographically fragmented than in the US. 
Given that the region itself does not constitute a very 
strong driver for further expansion in the Beaufort 
Sea, the decision to open up for offshore lease sales 
and approve exploratory drillings is more closely 
linked to interests in Ottawa. These interests play 
into the fact that Canada is emerging as an interna-
tional heavy weight in oil and gas production due to 
the presence of oil sands in Alberta and petroleum 
production in the provinces of New Brunswick and 
Newfoundland. A federal push, similar to the one 
seen in the 1970s, to develop costly and remote 
Arctic gas fields, is, however, not inevitable, because 
Canada is not largely dependent on developing these 
resources for domestic energy supplies. Although 
there undoubtedly exists a strong commercial inter-
est in developing offshore fields in the Beaufort Sea, 
and both regional and federal levels openly favour oil 
and gas development in the Arctic, there is less lev-
eraging of these interests in comparison to the US.
Denmark and the European Union
In terms of regional/federal relationships, the case 
of offshore Greenland is set apart from both those 
of Canada and the US. In comparison with both 
Alaska and the Northwest Territories, Greenland can 
exploit potential resources as it sees fit, although it 
is still part of the realm of Denmark (Hammeken-
Holm 2012b). Devolving the final development de-
cision to the local population has undoubtedly been 
a central factor in setting the current rapid pace of 
development. As highlighted in the previous section, 
there are strong drivers in Greenland for activities 
that encourage economic independence from Den-
mark. However, though Greenland is by far the most 
autonomous territory of the North American Arctic, 
its relationship with the national government in Co-
penhagen still influences its aspirations to continue 
to develop oil and gas fields offshore (Hammeken-
Holm 2012a). Governments in Copenhagen have 
nonetheless been strong supporters of this devel-
opment, due to both revenue expectations and in-
clusion of Danish industry, like Dong Energy (De-
georges 2012). Moreover, Denmark has played a 
substantial role in developing local competence and 
mechanisms in Greenland to deal with the influx of 
petroleum interests (ibid.). 
Although Denmark currently supports Greenlan-
dic petroleum exploration, though it lost its say in 
the matter in 2009, the balance between regional 
interests in Greenland and popular opinion in Den-
mark might become a source of tension, should the 
latter shift against Greenlandic development. The 
relationship between interests in Copenhagen and 
interests in Nuuk has not always been amicable, 
and sections of the Greenlandic population would 
seem to prefer full independence from Denmark at 
some point in the future (Ward & Pfeifer 2010). Be-
ing connected to, but not part of, the European Un-
ion, Greenlanders have also experienced the effect 
of Brussels-based interests trying to meddle in the 
island’s resource management. The EU’s 2008 im-
port ban on seal products, as well as negative state-
ments against Greenlandic Arctic petroleum explo-
ration, have caused resentment in a self-government 
that perceives resource development to constitute 
the fastest way to economic growth (Ward & Pfeifer 
2010). Especially in the European Parliament, envi-
ronmentally focused members have actively teamed 
up with the recent Greenpeace campaign “Save the 
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Arctic”, directed at Greenland in particular (Green-
peace 2012). Although Greenland has greater inter-
nal cohesion than its North American counterparts, 
it is struggling harder against external interference 
and popular opinion beyond the borders of the realm 
of Denmark. While this might not pose any imme-
diate problems, the long-term effects are harder to 
predict.
COMPARING REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
As outlined above, the role of regions, in terms of 
how their interests are formed, conveyed and con-
strained, constitutes an important determinant of 
the pace and trajectory of Arctic petroleum develop-
ment on a case-specific level. Table 2 summarises 
the dimensions evaluated, allowing us to draw some 
comparisons and conclusions. 
The State of Alaska clearly has powerful regional 
interests in offshore development in the Chukchi 
Sea. Weak internal cohesion, however, is an issue as 
opinion here is significantly more polarised than in 
the other two cases. The federal level, the State, local 
indigenous communities, engaged NGOs and com-
mercial actors like Shell and Alyeska are all highly 
active, and influential, in determining the process 
of opening up the region for oil and gas exploration. 
The State itself enjoys a strong degree of autonomy 
in its dealings with the petroleum industry and de-
velopment matters inside its geographical boundary. 
In Arctic offshore development, on the other hand, 
the federal government is the empowered decision-
making authority. The federal level has a moderate 
degree of interest in development, but has clearly 
been cautious in its handling of the issue. In particu-
lar, the relationship between federal bureaus located 
in Washington D.C., local groups in Alaska, and the 
interests of the Alaskan State government, is likely 
to be conflictual for any sitting administration. As 
a result, the project itself faces obstacles both at a 
local and national level, while the regional level cur-
rently functions as an active facilitator and lobbyist 
for development without the tools to transform those 
interests into corresponding policies.
By contrast, offshore Arctic petroleum development 
in the Canadian Beaufort Sea seems less defined 
by stated regional interests; they are vocalised less 
strongly at least than those encountered in neigh-
bouring Alaska. Internal cohesion is also at a mod-
erate level, as tensions between competing interests 
have by no means reached the level of polarisation 





















Decision-making   
authority Federal Federal Regional
Federal 
interests Moderate Weak Strong
 = Role of regional 
level
Active facilitator and 
lobbyist
Passive facilitator
Active facilitator and 
developer 
TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF THE REGIONAL DIMENSION IN ARCTIC OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT
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in Alaska. But the Northwest Territories has much 
less autonomy than its US. counterpart, despite 
changes currently underway. Federal interest in pro-
moting such development, which ultimately deter-
mines when to open up for lease sales and drillings, 
is therefore weak, not least given the current national 
energy abundance. Should large quantities of recov-
erable oil or gas be discovered in the near future, 
however, this situation could change rapidly. None-
theless, the challenges relating to lack of regional 
and federal-level interest will continue to weigh on 
development in the short to medium term, and the 
regional level can currently only act as a passive fa-
cilitator of future development. 
Offshore development in Greenland is the most 
anomalous of the three cases, given that the territory 
it has acquired a larger degree of autonomy over the 
management of its natural resources than its regional 
counterparts. This autonomy is coupled with strong 
regional and national (Danish) interests in offshore 
development, as the drive for economic independ-
ence spurs the Greenlandic self-government while 
Copenhagen is interested in the potential economic 
benefits for Denmark. Development in Greenland 
has also been influenced by a somewhat different 
range of factors than in Alaska and the Northwest 
Territories, as internal cohesion is comparatively 
strong and the main challenges to development have 
come from outside the realm of Denmark. That said, 
increased regional authority over petroleum produc-
tion also gives the regional level greater influence to 
determine developments looking ahead. Commercial 
viability plays into it, as does local and international 
civic engagement, but it should be clear that of the 
three regions in question, Greenland is the only one 
holding the key to its own potential riches. 
To summarise the table, in the US and Canada the 
federal government has authority over the Outer 
Continental Shelf; the regional governments in 
Alaska and the Northwest Territories can therefore 
only act as facilitators, promoting their individual 
interests when a federal decision is underway. In 
these two cases, the locus of decision-making power 
lies outside of the Arctic Circle, and a decision is 
the result of the balance struck by respective fed-
eral governments between different policy interests. 
In Greenland, however, the line of sight between 
regional interests and policy outcomes is substan-
tially clearer, as decision-making competences are 
devolved to the regional self-government. However, 
Greenland’s enduring relationship with Denmark 
and the EU is a systemic factor that still should be 
taken into consideration. 
CONCLUSION
Looking beyond wider international trends such as 
price levels, technology and retreating ice sheets, 
this study set out to identify and analyse what influ-
ences specific development of offshore oil and gas in 
the Arctic. The article has focused in particular on 
development drivers in areas of the Arctic that can 
be regarded as somewhat conflictual, pitting com-
mercial interests against environmental and/or lo-
cal forces. A key dimension, namely the interests of 
those actually residing in these areas – represented 
by their respective regional governments – was an-
other concern of the study, as it is an often neglected 
or understated factor in the current Arctic research 
literature. The study therefore asked: what role do 
regional interests have in the process of developing 
oil and gas in the North American Arctic?
With no current offshore production activity, but a 
rapid pace of development that is expected to result 
in exploratory drillings in the near future, the North 
American Arctic was chosen as the focus area. The 
three cases studied here, namely the Chukchi Sea, 
the Beaufort Sea, and the offshore waters around 
Greenland, share relatively similar climactic condi-
tions. However, the development of petroleum has 
progressed at different rates, even as Arctic oil and 
gas figure increasingly on the international agenda 
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and the North American Arctic experiences an influx 
of commercial interests. 
By looking at the processes surrounding this influx 
of new commercial interests, and those factors de-
termining the pace of development in each case, 
some important conclusions can be made. Interest 
in all three regions is undoubtedly influenced by the 
level of hydrocarbon resources in offshore basins, as 
outlined by the USGS and other geological surveys. 
Together with international price trends, accessi-
bility, transport infrastructure and the cost of Arc-
tic operations, it informs estimates of commercial 
viability in each case. Commercial viability in turn 
determines the extent to which commercial actors, 
such as Shell, Statoil or Cairn, push for exploratory 
offshore drilling. 
Yet this study has shown that case-specific devel-
opment is also influenced by the interests of the 
implicated regional actors. The way regional govern-
ments define their interests in petroleum develop-
ment, the article suggests, constitutes the basis of 
regions’ participation in the development process. 
The relationship between regional governments and 
the national/federal level, in terms of both decision-
making competence and autonomy, then determines 
how regional interests are transformed into correlat-
ing policies. This in turn determines which interests 
emerge at the national/federal level in the course of 
Arctic petroleum development, with regional cohe-
sion and external influences also contributing to the 
political environment in which decisions to allow ex-
ploratory drillings are made. 
Exhibiting strong regional interests, the State of Alas-
ka continues to push for development of the Chuk-
chi Sea, although the final decision is made federally 
by the Department of Interior in Washington D.C. 
The State consequently acts as a facilitator, with lo-
cal interest groups and environmental o rganisations 
attempting to halt development at every crossroad. 
The Canadian Beaufort Sea is similar to the US case 
in terms of decision-making locus for outer conti-
nental shelf development. Regional interests, how-
ever, are not as strongly defined as in Alaska, and the 
Territories is therefore not as active in policy-making 
processes. Greenland, as the most autonomous of 
the three regions, has acquired self-governance over 
its offshore petroleum resources. Similar to Alaska, 
the Greenlandic government has been actively push-
ing the cause of development: by encouraging com-
mercial interests in the region, and by conducting 
lease sales in rapid succession from 2006 onwards. 
While development of the Chukchi Sea has encoun-
tered domestic resistance in the US, Greenlandic 
offshore development has encountered international 
resistance from the EU and Greenpeace.
It is interesting to note that the Arctic often creates 
strong popular sentiment amongst people who do 
not reside in the region itself. Due to the use of the 
Arctic as a symbol of pristine nature and the deva-
stating effects of climate change, there is undoubt-
edly a strong desire in capitals like Ottawa, Wash-
ington D.C. and Copenhagen to prevent industrial 
activity in the Arctic (Emmerson 2010; Williams 
2011). Local inhabitants of the Arctic, however, do 
not always share such sentiments. Non-Arctic in-
terference in matters of development has long been 
a source of conflict for Arctic inhabitants (Williams 
2011). The Arctic is also populated by different 
groups of people, and the question of how to deal 
with the increased influx of commercial interests to 
the region could cause tensions to rise between non-
indigenous regional populations and indigenous lo-
cal populations.
Altogether, these comparisons show that interna-
tional trends and commercial viability, while im-
portant, are not the only factors to consider when 
tracking and explaining development processes in 
the Arctic. Offshore activity takes place in the con-
text of regions, both geographically and politically, 
and in all three cases regional governments interact 
with centrally located decision-makers, in addition 
to commercial, environmental and social actors. The 
relationship between the regional level, where Arctic 
offshore developments are actually taking place, and 
the national level, often located far from the Arctic, 
therefore constitutes another important, but argu-
ably also frequently neglected, determinant of the 
development of Arctic oil and gas.
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This observation might hold true of other areas of the 
Arctic given the controversies surrounding offshore 
development in Northern Norway or in Northwest 
Russia. But the Arctic is not the only part of the world 
facing an influx of commercial interests. Deepwater 
drilling has boomed in the last decade, with contro-
versial offshore fields west of the Shetland Islands 
in the UK, off the coast of Brazil, and in ‘iceberg 
alley’ off Newfoundland in Canada, currently being 
explored for recoverable resources. As the price of 
petroleum products soars, and new technologies and 
increased market demand are pushing companies 
towards new and challenging areas like the Arctic, 
the role of the regions in which these activities take 
place is only set to increase. Consequently, (1) the 
interests manifesting in these regions; (2) the way 
regional governments interact with central decision-
makers and commercial interests; and (3) how this 
interaction in turn contributes to the pace of devel-
opment, are matters for further research. 
Such studies will help inform the broader Arctic 
debate in which generalisations often seem to take 
preference over case-by-case analyses. Some of the 
existing research tends to treat the Arctic as a coher-
ent area, when in fact it comprises different econom-
ic and political areas and regions, with different cli-
matic zones and levels of development. After looking 
at the development of oil and gas in these different 
regions, it is clear that the Arctic itself is c omplex, 
multi-layered and difficult to generalise across. The 
multiple interests at stake in Arctic petroleum de-
velopment can vary considerably within a particular 
geographic area. Discourse and research on the Arc-
tic need to be nuanced and differentiated accord-
ingly, with a greater focus on the interests of those 
in the regions themselves, as identified here, and the 
dynamics that determine much of the case-specific 
activities. Indeed, if the different layers of Arctic de-
velopment were to be systematically isolated and 
taken into account, discussions on Arctic petroleum 
development might be able to move away from oft-
cited generalisations and take the debate to a new 
level, applicable beyond the geographic boundaries 
of the Arctic itself.
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